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Key-dependent message (KDM) security was introduced by Black, Rogaway and Shrimpton to
address the case where key cycles occur among encryptions, e.g., a key is encrypted with itself. It
was mainly motivated by key cycles in Dolev-Yao models, i.e., symbolic abstractions of cryptography
by term algebras, and a corresponding computational soundness result was later shown by Ada˜o et
al. However, both the KDM definition and this soundness result do not allow the general active
attacks typical for Dolev-Yao models or for security protocols in general.
We extend these definitions to obtain a soundness result under active attacks. We first present
a definition AKDM (adaptive KDM) as a KDM equivalent of authenticated symmetric encryption,
i.e., it provides chosen-ciphertext security and integrity of ciphertexts for key cycles. However,
this is not yet sufficient for the desired computational soundness result and thus we define DKDM
(dynamic KDM) that additionally allows limited dynamic revelation of keys. We show that DKDM
is sufficient for computational soundness, even in the strong sense of blackbox reactive simulatability
(BRSIM)/UC and in cases with joint terms with other operators.
We also build on current KDM-secure schemes to construct schemes secure under the new def-
initions. Moreover, we prove implications or construct separating examples, respectively, for new
definitions and existing ones for symmetric encryption.
1 Introduction
Encryption schemes are the oldest and arguably the most important cryptographic schemes. Their secu-
rity has been rigorously studied very early, starting with Shannon’s work for the information-theoretic
case [52]. Computational definitions for public-key encryption were developed over time, in particular
in [42, 54, 51, 37]. The strongest of these definitions is security against adaptive chosen-ciphertext at-
tacks, abbreviated IND-CCA2 [29]; it is nowadays strongly believed to cover what one expects from
secure encryption on its own. For symmetric encryption, the first real definitions were, to the best of
our knowledge, given in [37, 45, 28], using the same basic ideas.
However, for use within larger protocols, additional requirements on encryption schemes are still
emerging. One specific additional requirement is the ability to securely encrypt key-dependent messages.
The first concrete use case occurred in [32], where encryption of different private keys with one another
was used to implement an all-or-nothing property in a credential system to discourage people from
transferring individual credentials. Another area that brought up this requirement is the use of formal
methods or symbolic cryptography. Here the question is whether simple abstractions of cryptographic
primitives exist that can be used by automated proof tools (model checkers or theorem provers) to prove
∗An earlier version of this work appeared in [18].
or disprove a wide range of security protocols that use cryptography in a blackbox manner. The best-
known abstractions are term algebras constructed from certain base types and cryptographic operators
such as E and D for en- and decryption, called Dolev-Yao models after the first such abstraction [38].
As soon as one has a multi-user variant of such a model, the keys are explicit base terms. Hence
from the term algebra side it is natural that keys can also be encrypted (i.e., used as leaves in arbitrary
terms). Thus most Dolev-Yao models simply assume that key cycles are allowed. Once the cryptographic
justification of such models was started in [2], it was recognized that key cycles had to be excluded from
the original models to get cryptographic results. The same holds for later results [1, 43, 22, 20, 44, 21,
25, 48, 15, 36, 35].
Motivated primarily by symbolic cryptography, a definition of key-dependent message security (KDM
security) was introduced in [31]. It generalizes the definition from [32] by allowing arbitrary functions of
the keys (and not just individual keys) as plaintexts, and by considering symmetric encryption schemes.
Furthermore, [31] gives a construction of a KDM-secure scheme in the random oracle model. Using the
KDM definition, [3] extended the results about the computational soundness of Dolev-Yao models in a
passive setting to include key cycles. Still, Dolev-Yao models are only of limited interest in a passive
setting because their main usage is in protocol proofs, where active attackers are a standard threat.
In this work, we extend the definition of KDM security to active attacks and, as this also is needed
for the desired soundness proof of Dolev-Yao models with key cycles, to a limited dynamic revelation of
keys. We speak of AKDM security and DKDM security for adaptive KDM security and dynamic KDM
security, respectively. While dynamic revelations of keys in cryptography mostly occur as a consequence
of adversary models with dynamic corruption of participants, we will see that in the class of protocols
typically treated with Dolev-Yao models, they can occur even under static corruptions, which are the
standard adversarymodel in Dolev-Yao models. After the definitions (Section 2), we present the following
results:
• In Section 3, we construct symmetric encryption schemes secure under the new definitions. For
AKDM security we achieve this by a generic construction from KDM-secure schemes and MACs
(message authentication codes). For DKDM security we present a direct construction in the random
oracle model.
• In Section 4, we show that DKDM security is sufficient for the soundness of symbolic symmetric
encryption in the strong sense of blackbox reactive simulatability (BRSIM)/UC [49, 50, 34, 24,
23, 26]. This notion entails strong compositionality guarantees and the retention of a variety of
security properties.
• In Section 5, we explore the relationships between the definition variants, also in combination with
standard definitions of symmetric encryption. For instance, we consider whether KDM-secure
schemes that are also IND-CCA2-secure are automatically AKDM-secure. (No, they are not.) The
relationship of AKDM and DKDM is particularly important since we can achieve AKDM security
by a generic construction based on KDM security, while we need DKDM security in the soundness
proof. We show that both definitions coincide provided that either only a logarithmically bounded
number of keys are used, or only a constant number is revealed. The question whether both
definitions coincide for arbitrary leakages of keys remains open in this paper and seems similar to
the selective decommitment problem [39], but not directly related to the cases with known answers.
• Our definitions include a variant that we call polynomial-oracle; we also define such a variant
for KDM security and consider it when exploring the relation between the definitions. We be-
lieve this will be needed to successfully construct KDM-secure schemes in the standard model of
cryptography in the future.
• We show that for stateful encryption schemes, semantic security does not imply KDM security
even if only key cycles of an arbitrary minimum size i are allowed (within Section 5). In [31] all
separating results require key cycles of length 1.
Clearly, the constructions that we present in Section 3 are for cases where no simpler equivalence with
prior definitions exists in Section 5.
2
2 Adaptive and Dynamic Security Definitions with Key Cycles
This section contains our new definitions of AKDM and DKDM security. While the first definition
constitutes a natural extension of KDM security to active attacks, the second one additionally allows
limited dynamic revelation of keys. This is needed for the desired soundness proof of Dolev-Yao models
with key cycles.
We start by summarizing basic notation needed for defining and extending the notion of KDM security
as introduced in [31].1 We write “:=” for deterministic and “←” for probabilistic assignment, and “ R←”
for uniform random choice from a set. An error element ↓ is available as an addition to the domains and
ranges of all functions and algorithms. By x := ++y for integer variables x, y we mean y := y+1;x := y.
The length of a string m is denoted by |m|, a string of l zero-bits is written 0l, and string concatenation
||.
Like many current cryptographic definitions, the AKDM and DKDM definitions are written in terms
of oracles performing actions of an honest participant and adversaries. Oracles and adversaries can
be considered interactive probabilistic Turing machines (except that the original KDM definition cor-
responds to an interactive infinite-state system) where oracles have one communication tape pair, and
adversaries have one communication tape pair (or several if they use several oracles) and an additional
output tape. The final content of this output tape is considered the result of a joint computation and
can be used in expressions, e.g., equations of the form “AO = x”. That an oracle offers a query type q
means that it accepts inputs of the form q and returns one output for each such input.
We always write k for a security parameter, which is a natural number. It is an input of all the
following machines, adversaries as well as oracles, but omitted in the notation for readability. For
instance, we write AO and not A(k)O(k) to denote an adversary A using an oracle O. Thus the resulting
expressions are functions of k, and terms like “negligible” are meaningful for them. In particular, a
function g : N → R≥0 is called negligible iff for all positive polynomials Q, there exists k0 such that
g(k) ≤ 1/Q(k) for all k ≥ k0. Like some underlying papers we use the word “advantage” loosely for
measures of adversary success (with precise definitions of those measures, of course).
Definition 2.1 (Symmetric Encryption) A symmetric encryption scheme is a tuple SE =
(genSE,E,D) of polynomial-time algorithms. Key generation with a security parameter k ∈ N is written
sk ← genSE(0
k). The (probabilistic) encryption of a message m ∈ {0, 1}+ is denoted by c ← E(sk ,m),
and decryption by m := D(sk , c). The result may be ↓; then the ciphertext is called invalid for this key.
Decryption of a correctly generated ciphertext for a correctly generated key must always yield the original
plaintext.
We assume without loss of generality that keys for a fixed security parameter k are of a fixed length.
✸
We repeat two typical definitions of encryption security.
Definition 2.2 (Indistinguishability under Chosen-ciphertext Attacks) Given a symmetric en-
cryption scheme SE = (genSE,E,D), the IND-CCA2 oracle SymCCA2 is defined as follows:2 It has a
variable sk initialized as sk ← genSE(0k), a bit b initialized as b
R← {0, 1}, an initially empty set C and
the following query types:
• On input (enc,m): Let m0 := m and m1 := 0|m|, set c← E(sk ,mb) and C := C ∪ {c}, and output
c.
• On input (dec, c): If c 6∈ C, return D(sk , c), else ↓.
The IND-CCA2 advantage of an adversary A that interacts with SymCCA2 and finally outputs a bit b∗
is defined as AdvCCA2(A) := |Pr[ASymCCA2 = 1 | b = 0] − Pr[ASymCCA2 = 1 | b = 1]|. We say that SE
is indistinguishable under adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack or IND-CCA2-secure iff the IND-CCA2
1KDM security was also proposed for asymmetric encryption schemes in [31]. In this paper, we focus on the symmetric
setting, but our extended definitions of key-dependent message security can be recast in the asymmetric setting as well.
2A rigorous notation would be SymCCA2SE , but usually the encryption scheme is clear from the context; then we omit
it. A similar remark holds for the advantage expression and for all the following oracle definitions.
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advantage of every polynomial-time adversary is negligible. (Recall that the expression is a function of
the security parameter k by our conventions.) ✸
We call SymCCA2 with b = 0 the real IND-CCA2 oracle and with b = 1 the fake IND-CCA2 oracle, and
similarly for the following oracles that have a bit b.
Definition 2.3 (Integrity of Ciphertexts) Given a symmetric encryption scheme SE =
(genSE,E,D), the ciphertext-integrity oracle or INT-CTXT oracle SymInt is defined as follows:
It has a variable sk initialized as sk ← genSE(0k), an initially empty set C , and the following query
types:
• On input (enc,m): Set c ← E(sk ,m) and C := C ∪ {c}, and output c.
• On input (dec, c): Return m := D(sk , c).
The INT-CTXT advantage Adv INT(A) of an adversary A that interacts with SymInt is defined as the
probability that SymInt outputs m 6= ↓ on any input (dec, c) with c 6∈ C. The encryption scheme is said
to provide integrity of ciphertexts or to be INT-CTXT-secure iff the INT-CTXT advantage of every
probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A is negligible. ✸
The notion of key-dependent message (KDM) security introduced in [31] as well as our extensions of it
use encryption oracles that explicitly deal with messages that depend on keys. Instead of a fixed plaintext
m, they accept a function g of the secret keys in encryption queries. For this, the oracle immediately
handles several keys, here actually virtually infinitely many. Formally, encryption oracles offer query
types (enc, j, g) meaning that the j-th key should be used to encrypt the result of evaluating the function
g on the secret keys. In [31] the input g is required to be a RAM program for some fixed RAM machine
model, and to represent a function fg that maps an infinite sequence ~sk of secret keys to a bitstring,
i.e., fg : ({0, 1}∗)∞ → {0, 1}+. We assume that the RAM model means that the key numbers used are
explicitly visible in the program g. Additionally, every fg must be a function with fixed-length outputs
for a given, fixed security parameter.3 Let F∞ denote all these permitted programs, and let A∞ denote
the class of polynomial-time adversaries using only permitted programs g ∈ F∞ in encryption queries.
The notation in [31] does not distinguish fg and g, and thus we also always write g in the following. We
write πi to denote the program that computes the projection to the i-th key. Finally, we define “i ∈ g”
for a program g ∈ F∞ and a key number i ∈ N to mean that the i-th key is addressed by the program g.
In addition to these encryption queries, the new definition of adaptive KDM (AKDM) security allows
decryption queries. (This is similar to definitions IND-CCA2 and the integrity of ciphertexts.) Here,
decryption queries are of the form (dec, j, c); this means that the ciphertext c should be decrypted
with the j-th key. We define AKDM security immediately in a polynomial-oracle version besides an
unrestricted version closer to the original KDM definition. The problem with the unrestricted version,
if one thinks of potential realizations in the standard model of cryptography, is that the adversary
can force the oracle to perform non-polynomial-time computations. We exclude this by the polynomial-
oracle version. The following p-oracle-bounded adversaries have the appropriate behavior for a particular
polynomial p. We immediately include reveal queries so that we can use the same adversary classes for
DKDM. (An adversary trying to reveal queries on the oracle in the AKDM definition will just get an
error result.)
Definition 2.4 (p-oracle-bounded Adversaries) For every polynomial p, we define the class Ap of
p-oracle-bounded adversaries as the set of adversaries A ∈ A∞ with the following additional property:
For every security parameter k and every query (enc, j, g) or (dec, j, c) that A makes, we have j ≤ p(k)
and i ≤ p(k) for all i ∈ g, and the Turing complexity of g is at most p(k). If A also makes queries
(reveal, j), then also j ≤ p(k). (Queries of the form (reveal, j) will be used in dynamic security notions
below.) ✸
3The definition simply assumes that inputs g are indeed fixed-length. The oracle could also achieve this property
algorithmically if encryption queries are augmented by a parameter l ∈ N and the oracle cuts or pads the function g( ~sk)
of the keys to l bits.
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Definition 2.5 (AKDM Security) Given a symmetric encryption scheme SE = (genSE,E,D) the
adaptive key-dependent message oracle or AKDM oracle SymAKDM is defined as follows: It has a (vir-
tual) infinite key sequence ~sk = (sk i)i∈N where each key, when first used, is initialized as sk i ← genSE(0k),
an initially empty set C of ciphertexts made, a bit b initialized as b R← {0, 1}, and the following query
types:
• On input (enc, j, g): Let m0 := g( ~sk) and m1 := 0|m0|, encrypt c ← E(sk j ,mb), store c as C :=
C ∪ {(j, c)}, and output c.
• On input (dec, j, c) with j ∈ N and c ∈ {0, 1}+: If (j, c) ∈ C, output ↓, else output m := D(sk j , c)
if b = 0 and ↓ if b = 1.
The AKDM advantage of an adversary A that interacts with SymAKDM and finally outputs a bit b∗ is
defined as AdvAKDM(A) := |Pr[ASymAKDM = 1 | b = 0] − Pr[ASymAKDM = 1 | b = 1]|. We say that SE is
(unrestricted) AKDM-secure or p-oracle-bounded AKDM-secure iff the AKDM advantage is negligible
for every adversary A ∈ A∞ or A ∈ Ap, respectively, and that it is polynomial-oracle AKDM-secure iff
it is p-oracle-bounded AKDM-secure for every polynomial p. ✸
We call SymAKDM with b = 0 the real AKDM oracle and with b = 1 the fake AKDM oracle, and
similarly for the following oracles that have a bit b. Extending Definition 2.5 such that proofs can be
conducted in the random oracle model can be achieved as usual by allowing both the AKDM oracle and
the adversary to query the same random function, called a random oracle. (More algorithmically, the
random oracle may choose a random answer when it first gets a query, and otherwise retrieve the prior
answer for the same query.)
Our second variant of KDM security is even stronger: keys may dynamically be revealed to the
adversary. Dynamic key revelations have been considered in cryptography before (although not for KDM
security, of course), in particular where the adversary may dynamically corrupt participants. However,
typical Dolev-Yao models do not consider dynamic corruptions and one might therefore expect the
desired soundness to hold already for AKDM-secure cryptographic realizations. But even scenarios with
static corruptions may lead to dynamic key revelations on the layer of the KDM security: For instance,
one can model protocols like group membership services where new participants may be included into
a group at any time. Thus an established group key is shared with a new participant who may be an
adversary. If one considers this situation for a protocol with key cycles, one immediately sees the need
for dynamic KDM security. Hence our DKDM definition adds key revelations to the AKDM oracle.
However, in these revelations we must exclude the commitment problem that is otherwise inherent in
symmetric encryption, i.e., the problem that if a message m was encrypted with a key sk , and later sk
becomes known, this allows the adversary to distinguish the real and fake oracle. For this, the oracle
maintains two sets Rev and Enc that denote the keys that were already revealed and those that were
already used for en- or decryption, respectively. Keys that are only part of the plaintext in an encryption
are not added to Enc. Keys from Enc are not revealed. While this may seem a rather weak form of
dynamic revelation, it already turns out to be sufficient for the desired soundness result, cf. Section 4.
When deployed in protocols facing strong adversaries, e.g., adaptive corruption of parties, the definition
might be further strengthened, e.g., by reflecting that revealing used keys does not leak any information
about encryptions computed with unrevealed keys.
Definition 2.6 (DKDM Security) Given a symmetric encryption scheme SE = (genSE,E,D), the
dynamic key-dependent message oracle or DKDM oracle SymDKDM is defined like the AKDM oracle
SymAKDM with the following changes:
• It maintains two sets Rev and Enc, which are initially empty.
• On input (reveal, j): If j 6∈ Enc, it sets Rev := Rev ∪ {j} and outputs sk j, else it outputs ↓.
• On input (enc, j, g) or (dec, j, c): If j ∈ Rev, it outputs ↓, else it acts as before and additionally
sets Enc := Enc ∪ {j}.
The DKDM advantage of an adversary A that interacts with SymDKDM and finally outputs a bit b∗ is
defined as AdvDKDM(A) := |Pr[ASymDKDM = 1 | b = 0] − Pr[ASymDKDM = 1 | b = 1]|. We say that SE is
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(unrestricted) DKDM-secure or p-oracle-bounded DKDM-secure iff the DKDM advantage is negligible
for every adversary A ∈ A∞ or A ∈ Ap, respectively, and that it is polynomial-oracle DKDM-secure iff
it is p-oracle-bounded AKDM-secure for every polynomial p. ✸
By construction, we always have Rev ∩ Enc = ∅.
3 Constructions of AKDM-secure and DKDM-secure Schemes
In this section we give explicit constructions of AKDM-secure and DKDM-secure schemes. For AKDM-
secure schemes, we can present a generic construction based on KDM-secure schemes and strongly
unforgeable message authentication codes (MACs); for DKDM-secure schemes, we present an explicit
construction in the random-oracle model.
3.1 AKDM-secure Schemes from KDM-secure Schemes and MACs
We show that the generic encrypt-then-MAC construction formalized in [30] yields an AKDM-secure
encryption scheme when applied to a KDM-secure encryption scheme and a strongly unforgeable MAC
scheme. We first repeat the underlying definitions.
Definition 3.1 (MAC Scheme) A MAC scheme, also called symmetric authentication scheme, is
a tuple MAC = (genMAC,MAC,Test) of polynomial-time algorithms. Key generation with a security
parameter k ∈ N is written sk ← genMAC(0k). The (potentially probabilistic) authentication of a message
m ∈ {0, 1}+ is denoted by t← MAC(sk ,m) (where “t” stands for “tag”), and testing by b := Test(sk ,m, t)
with an output b ∈ {true, false}. The tag is called valid (for the given message and key) iff b = true.
Testing a correctly generated MAC for a correctly generated key must always yield true. ✸
Definition 3.2 (Strong Unforgeability of MACs) Given a MAC scheme MAC =
(genMAC,MAC,Test), the strong unforgeability oracle or SU oracle MAC SU is defined as follows:
It has a variable sk initialized as sk ← genMAC(0
k), an initially empty set T, and the following query
types:
• On input (auth,m): Set t← MAC(sk ,m); T := T ∪ {(m, t)}, and output t.
• On input (test,m, t): Return Test(sk ,m, t).
The SU advantage AdvSU(A) of an adversary A that interacts with MAC SU is defined as the probability
that MAC SU returns true for an input (test,m, t) with (m, t) 6∈ T . The MAC scheme is called strongly
unforgeable iff the SU advantage of every probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A is negligible. ✸
Definition 3.3 (Encrypt-then-MAC Construction) Let an encryption scheme SE = (genSE,E,D)
and a MAC scheme MAC = (genMAC,MAC,Test) be given. Then the encrypt-then-MAC encryption
scheme Encrypt then MAC(SE ,MAC) is defined as follows:
• Keys are pairs (ske , sk f ), generated as ske ← genSE(0k) and sk f ← genMAC(0k).
• The encryption c of a message m with key (ske , sk f ) is computed as c′ ← E(ske ,m) and c :=
(c′,MAC(sk f , c′)).
• To decrypt a ciphertext c with key (ske , sk f ), decompose c into (c′, t). If this fails or Test(sk f , c′, t) 6=
true, output ↓, else output D(ske , c′).
✸
In the security proof of this construction, we need multiple MAC keys. A standard hybrid argument
shows that strong unforgeability of MACs extends to multiple keys. Hence in the respective proofs we
immediately assume a multi-key SU oracle MAC SU mult that also accepts queries (generate) upon which
it internally generates an additional key and whose other queries are extended with key numbers similar
to the AKDM oracle, i.e., they become (auth, j,m) and (test, j,m, t).
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Theorem 3.1 (AKDM Security of Encrypt-then-MAC) Let SE be a polynomial-oracle or unre-
stricted KDM-secure symmetric encryption scheme and let MAC be a strongly unforgeable MAC. Then
Encrypt then MAC(SE ,MAC) is a polynomial-oracle or unrestricted AKDM-secure encryption scheme,
respectively. ✷
Proof. Assume that an adversary A ∈ Ap has a not negligible AKDM advantage against SE
∗ :=
Encrypt then MAC(SE ,MAC), where p is a polynomial or ∞. We construct two adversaries ASE,1,p and
ASE,2,p against the KDM security of SE and an adversary AMAC,p against the strong unforgeability of
MAC, all using A as a blackbox, and we prove that at least one of them succeeds in its attack with not
negligible probability.
The adversary ASE,1,p for a polynomial p is defined as follows. It generates p(k) MAC keys, which
we call sk fi for i = 1, . . . , p(k) and maintains an initially empty set C of ciphertexts.
• Whenever A makes an encryption query (enc, j, g), then ASE,1,p for every i ∈ g inserts the MAC key
sk fi into all positions in g where the AKDM oracle for SE
∗ would use sk fi . This is clearly possible
in polynomial-time since g was constructed by the polynomial-time adversary A and, as a program,
is therefore of polynomial length. Furthermore, by definition of Ap, only keys with indices i ≤ p(k)
are used. Call the resulting function g∗. ASE,1,p then inputs (enc, j, g
∗) to the KDM oracle, gets a
ciphertext c′, computes t← MAC(sk fj , c
′) and c := (c′, t), sets C := C ∪ {(j, c)}, and outputs c to
A.
• Whenever A makes a decryption query (dec, j, c), then ASE,1,p decomposes c into (c′, t). If this fails
or (j, c) ∈ C or Test(sk fj , c
′, t) = false, it outputs ↓ to A. Otherwise it aborts the simulation; let E
denote the event that this happens.
• When A outputs a bit b∗ (meant to distinguish the real and fake oracle), ASE,1,p outputs b′ := b∗.
The definition of ASE,1,∞ is the same except for the generation and retrieval of the appropriate MAC
keys, because A may now use super-polynomial key indices j or i ∈ g. However, still only a polynomial
number of keys is used overall, and hence we can use lazy generation. For this, ASE,1,∞ maintains an
initially empty set sˆk of pairs (i, skfi ) of a key number and a MAC key instead of
~sk. When needing a
MAC key with index i during an encryption query, it checks whether there is an entry (i, skfi ) ∈ sˆk . If
yes, it reuses this key. Otherwise it generates the key and stores (i, skfi ).
The adversary ASE,2,p for every p is defined like ASE,1,p except that it outputs b
′ := 1 if the event E
occurs, and b′ := 0 otherwise.
Clearly the new adversaries ASE ,1,p and ASE,2,p for a polynomial p belong to the class of permitted
adversaries Ap′ for some polynomial p′. (Typically p′ = p because the only change is the substitution of
constants for variables in the programs g, which should not increase the runtime, but the programming
model is not so precisely fixed that this can be stated.)
The adversary AMAC,p for a polynomial p is defined as follows. It initially generates p(k) encryption
keys skei and lets the multi-key MAC oracle generate p(k) MAC keys internally. It maintains an initially
empty set C of ciphertexts of the encrypt-then-MAC scheme.




it always encrypts messages like the fake KDM oracle. It then inputs (auth, j, c′) to the multi-key
SU oracle yielding a tag t, sets c := (c′, t) and C := C ∪ {(j, c)}, and outputs c to A.
• Whenever A makes a decryption query (dec, j, c), then AMAC,p decomposes c into (c
′, t). If this fails
or (j, c) ∈ C , it outputs ↓ to A. Otherwise it asks the multi-key SU oracle the query (test, j, c′, t).
If the result is false, AMAC,p outputs ↓ to A, otherwise it stops the simulation (since t has proved
to be a MAC forgery). With respect to the behavior of A, this is exactly the event E again.
For the unrestricted case, AMAC,∞ is again defined like AMAC,p for polynomials p except that it uses
lazy generation of the encryption keys it really needs.
As long as the event E does not occur, both ASE,1,p and ASE,2,p together with the KDM oracle with
a bit b perfectly simulate the AKDM oracle with the same bit b for every p.
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Furthermore, AMAC,p together with the multi-key SU oracle perfectly simulates the fake AKDM
oracle, i.e., SymAKDM with b = 1, until it stops. Let real and fake denote the events b = 0 and b = 1,
respectively. By construction, the probability that AMAC,p breaks the strong unforgeability of the MAC
is AdvSU(AMAC,p) := Pr[E | fake]. We distinguish three cases:
• Case 1: If Pr[E | fake] is not negligible, then AMAC,p succeeds because Pr[E | fake] is exactly the
success probability AdvSU(AMAC,p).
• Case 2: If Pr[E] is negligible, then ASE,1,p succeeds: The advantage of both ASE,1,p and ASE,2,p
is
AdvKDM(ASE,i,p)
= |Pr[b′ = 1 | real]− Pr[b′ = 1 | fake]|
= |Pr[b′ = 1 | real ∧ E] · Pr[E | real] + Pr[b′ = 1 | real ∧ ¬E] · Pr[¬E | real]
−Pr[b′ = 1 | fake ∧ E] · Pr[E | fake]− Pr[b′ = 1 | fake ∧ ¬E] · Pr[¬E | fake]|.
For ASE,1,p and if ¬E holds, i.e., in the second and fourth term of the sum, we have b′ = b∗ by
construction. As Pr[E] is negligible, the first and third term are negligible. This also holds if
we replace b′ by b∗ in these terms. The resulting formula, where all b′’s are replaced by b∗’s, is
precisely the advantage AdvAKDM(A) against the AKDM security of SE
∗.
HenceAdvKDM(ASE,1,p) ≥ AdvAKDM(A)−ǫ(k) for some negligible ǫ(k). By assumption, AdvAKDM(A)
is not negligible. Thus AdvKDM(ASE,1,p) is also not negligible.
• Case 3: If Pr[E | fake] is negligible and Pr[E] is not negligible, then ASE,2,p succeeds: We use
the fomula for AdvKDM(ASE,2,p) from Case 2. Since ASE,2,p outputs 1 if the event E occurs and
0 otherwise, the second and fourth term of the sum are zero and Pr[b′ = 1 | real ∧ E] = Pr[b′ =
1 | fake∧E] = 1. Thus AdvKDM(ASE,2,p) = |Pr[E | real]−Pr[E | fake]|. As Pr[E | fake] is negligible
and Pr[E] is not negligible in this case, Pr[E | real] is not negligible. Therefore AdvKDM(ASE,2,p) is
not negligible either.
As one of these cases must be true, one of our three adversaries succeeds with not negligible probability.
This is the desired contraction and finishes the proof.
3.2 A DKDM-secure Scheme
In the following, we construct a DKDM-secure scheme directly from a random oracle H. For the time
being, we do not lose anything by this need as all currently known KDM-secure schemes are also in the
random oracle model. We only need a very weak version of the random oracle idealization: The oracle
must output independent random values for different inputs. We do not need reprogramming of the
oracle or similar features that are immediately problematic when the random oracle is replaced by real
hash functions.
The construction extends that of the KDM-secure scheme in [31]. We immediately assume that the
random oracle can take inputs of different lengths.
Definition 3.4 (DKDM-RO Construction) Let a random oracle H be given. We then construct a
symmetric encryption scheme SE = (genSE,E,D), called DKDM-RO scheme, as follows:
• Keys are pairs (ske , sk f ), generated as ske R← {0, 1}k and sk f R← {0, 1}k.
• The encryption c of a message m with key (ske , sk f ) is computed as r R← {0, 1}k; c′′ ← H(ske , r);
c′ ← c′′ ⊕m; and c := (r, c′,H(sk f , r, c′)).
• To decrypt a ciphertext c with key (ske , sk f ), decompose c into (r, c′, t). If this fails or H(sk f , r, c′) 6=
t, output ↓, else output c′ ⊕ H(ske , r).
✸
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Theorem 3.2 (Security of the DKDM-RO Scheme) In the random-oracle model, the DKDM-RO
scheme from Definition 3.4 is DKDM-secure. ✷
Proof. Let H be the random oracle, and at every time let its domain Dom(H) be the set of queries it
already answered. In the interaction of a polynomial-time adversary A and the DKDM oracle SymDKDM,
let E1 be the event that an encryption query (enc, j, g) happens such that the first random oracle call in
it is for an old value, i.e., already (skej , r) ∈ Dom(H). Clearly E1 only happens with exponentially small
probability within the polynomially many queries that A can make, because the second input part r is
chosen randomly by the oracle SymDKDM immediately before each query.
If E1 does not occur, we want to show that SymDKDM is perfectly indistinguishable from an oracle
SymDKDM1 that chooses each value c
′′ in an encryption randomly and independently instead of by a
random oracle call, and thus also from an oracle SymDKDM2 that chooses c
′ randomly for both values
of b (because c′′ serves as a one-time pad for m or 0|m| for b = 0 and b = 1, respectively). This could
only go wrong if skej became known to A, so that A could verify whether c
′′ = H(skej , r). However,
by induction over the steps in the run we can show that A never obtains any information about a key
(skej , sk
f
j ) that is or has been used in an en- or decryption, and that the values c
′′ are random, because
there are only two ways how information about such a key could leak: One is in a reveal query, but
the use of the sets Rev and Enc ensures that SymDKDM does not answer these for keys used in en- or
decryption. The other is within a message m in the real oracle; however, by the induction hypothesis
we know that this has not happened so far, and by the absence of E1 it does not happen now.
Now let E2 be the event that the adversary manages to make a decryption query (dec, j, c) where c
is a new ciphertext with a correct tag, i.e., we have (j, c) 6∈ C in SymDKDM2, but nevertheless c is a
triple (r, c′, t) with H(sk fj , r, c
′) = t. The condition (j, c) 6∈ C implies that SymDKDM2 has not called the
random oracle for (sk fj , r, c
′) in an encryption query (enc, j,m) for any m (because this format only fits
the second call there, and then SymDKDM2 would also have obtained the ciphertext c and stored (j, c)
in C). Furthermore, the probability is exponentially small that it made this call in an encryption query
for a value j′ 6= j because that would imply sk fj = sk
f
j ′ . Even for the non-polynomial DKDM oracle with
its infinitely many keys, this only happens with exponentially small probability for two values j, j′ that
A chooses in its polynomially many queries. If SymDKDM2 had made this query in a prior decryption
call, E2 would already have been violated earlier.
Hence A has not obtained information about the correct t from SymDKDM2. Thus it can guess t only
with exponentially small probability unless it makes a random oracle call for (sk fj , r, c
′) itself. However,
A can only guess this input with exponentially small probability because SymDKDM2 does not leak any
information about sk fj . Hence E2 only has exponentially small probability.
If E2 does not happen, SymDKDM2 is perfectly indistinguishable from an oracle SymDKDM3 that
always returns ↓ for encryption queries (dec, j, c) with (j, c) 6∈ C, independent of b. The reaction on such
encryption queries was the only other difference between the real and fake oracle, i.e., between b = 0
and b = 1. Hence A has the DKDM advantage 0 when interacting with SymDKDM3, and thus at most
an exponentially small one when interacting with the original oracle SymDKDM.
4 Sound Symbolic Symmetric Encryption in the Sense of BR-
SIM/UC
In this section, we show that DKDM security is the right notion to prove the soundness of a Dolev-Yao
model (in other words a formal or symbolic model) of symmetric encryption permitting key cycles in the
sense of blackbox reactive simulatability/UC, short BRSIM/UC.
We prove soundness for a symbolic model whose terms may contain not only symmetric encryption
operators, but also asymmetric encryption, signatures, and message authentication codes, as well as lists
(pairing), nonces, and payload messages. We prove BRSIM/UC for the symbolic system as the ideal
functionality and the cryptographic realization as the real functionality. By the composition theorems of
BRSIM/UC, this implies BRSIM/UC also for all protocols that are designed with the symbolic version
and then used with the real version. By the property preservation theorems of BRSIM/UC, this implies
that typical security properties are retained between the symbolic and the real version, in particular for
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integrity, fairness, liveness, and non-interference [9, 19, 13, 12, 16, 4]. Moreover, recent work has shown
that computational soundness in the sense of BRSIM/UC entails stronger guarantees than relying on
mappings between ideal and real traces, which underlies most computational soundness results that do
not strive for BRSIM/UC [8].
As we do not want to make a soundness proof from scratch, but build upon an existing one with
the same primitives, only without key cycles, we build upon [15], the extension of the soundness result
from [20] by symmetric encryption. This line of work is so far the only one proving BRSIM/UC for
the symbolic model as such, and the only one with such a large set of primitives. Moreover, tailored
tool support for this library was recently added [53, 10], and it turned out to be useful to conduct
computational soundness proofs for a variety of cryptographic protocols [14, 5, 7, 17, 11, 6]. It turns
out that we do not have to change the ideal and real functionality from [15] at all, as the absence of key
cycles is modeled by a condition on the users of these functionalities there (typically protocols). Thus we
omit this constraint and show that implementing the real system with a polynomial-oracle DKDM-secure
encryption scheme gives the desired soundness result. We start by reviewing the notion of BRSIM/UC
and by outlining the ideal functionality and the realization from [15]. Readers familiar with these topics
can immediately proceed with Section 4.4.
4.1 Dolev-Yao Models in the BRSIM/UC Setting
BRSIM/UC is used for comparing an ideal and a real system with respect to security. We use this
joint name for the closely related models of which different pieces were first introduced in [49, 50, 34],
building upon secure (one-step) multi-party computation [40, 41, 27, 47, 33]. Reactive simulatability
between the real and ideal system essentially means that for all attacks on the real system there exists an
equivalent attack on the ideal system. More precisely, blackbox simulatability states that there exists a
simulator Sim that can use an arbitrary real adversary as a blackbox, such that arbitrary honest users H
cannot distinguish whether they interact with the real system and the real adversary A, or with the ideal
system and the simulator with its blackbox. We always assume that all parties are polynomial-time.
The ideal system is often called TH for “trusted host”, and the protocol machines of the real system
are often called Mu, where u is a user index. In our specific case of symbolic cryptography, the trusted
host encapsulates the Dolev-Yao model while the real system is the distributed system that uses actual
cryptographic algorithms and exchanges actual bitstrings.
Establishing a BRSIM/UC relation between a Dolev-Yao model and its realization requires some
common syntax how higher protocols interact with the ideal Dolev-Yao functionality and the realization;
in the underlying model from [15] this is done by letting the protocols operate on terms or real bitstrings,
respectively, via local names called handles. Like all Dolev-Yao-style models when actually used for
protocol modeling, e.g., using a special-purpose calculus or embedded in CSP or pi-calculus, the model
in [15], called the BPW model henceforth after the authors of this paper, has state. An important use
of state is to model which participants already know which terms. Here this is given by the handles,
i.e., the adversary’s knowledge set is the set of terms to which the adversary has a handle. Another
use of state is to remember different versions of terms of the same structure for probabilistic operations
such as nonce or key generation. In [20], as probably first in [46], the probabilism is abstracted from by
counting, i.e., by assigning successive natural numbers to terms, here globally over all types. This index
of a term allows us (not the participants) to refer to terms unambiguously.
The users can operate on terms in the expected ways, e.g., ask the system to en- or decrypt a term
or to generate an additional key. Further, they can input that a term should be sent to another user. In
the symbolic representation this only changes the knowledge sets, i.e., in this specific Dolev-Yao model
the intended recipient and/or the adversary (depending on the security of the chosen channel) obtains
a handle to the term.
4.2 State Representation of the BPW Model
The BPW model of [15], i.e., the ideal functionality of symbolic cryptography, is called Syscry sym,idn,L .
(The parameters n and L are of no relevance here; n is the number of participants, L a set of functions
enabling one to abstractly compute the leaking length of a term.) Its state is represented as a database D
of the existing terms. Each term is characterized by its type (top-level operator) type, the list arg of its
10
top-level arguments, the handles hndu for different participants u, the index ind mentioned before, and a
length len (needed because encryption cannot completely hide the length of messages). The non-atomic
direct subterms of a term (i.e., excluding the term itself) are represented by their indices in the list arg .
As we build on [15] we repeat some of their notation: A database D is a set of functions, called
entries, each over a finite domain called attributes. For an entry x ∈ D, the value at an attribute att is
written x.att . For a predicate pred over the attributes, D[pred ] is the subset of entries that fulfill pred .
If |D[pred ]| = 1, the same notation is used for its one element. An underlying list operation is written
l := (x1, . . . , xj), where the arguments are unambiguously retrievable as l[i], with l[i] = ↓ if i > j.
The indices ind come from a set INDS isomorphic to N, and terms are successively numbered with
it in the order of their creation. Index variables sometimes have a superscript “ind” for distinction. One
writes D[i] for the i-th term, i.e., short for D[ind = i]. We often say “term i” below for this. The types
range over a set typeset with skse, symenc ∈ typeset denoting symmetric encryption keys and symmetric
encryptions, respectively. Each handle hndu comes from a set HNDS, also isomorphic to N. If it
has the “undefined” value ↓, participant u does not know this term (yet). Particularly important is the
adversary handle hnda (especially whether it is ↓ or not). Otherwise, u ranges over a set H of indices of
honest users. Handle variables always get a superscript “hnd”.
4.3 The Realization of the BPW Model
The realization of the BPWmodel is called Syscry sym,realn,S,E,SA,SE,L′ . (Here n is the number of participants, S, E ,
SA and SE are underlying secure signature, asymmetric encryption, symmetric message authentication
and symmetric encryption schemes and L′ is a tuple of functions determining lengths and runtime
bounds.) Here each user u has a separate machineMu which contains a databaseDu where real bitstrings
word are stored under the handles hndu for this user, as well as for convenience the type type. The users
can use exactly the same commands as to the BPW model, e.g., en- or decrypt a message etc. These
commands now trigger real cryptographic operations. The operations essentially use cryptographically
secure primitives – a DKDM-secure symmetric encryption scheme as the main scheme in our case – but
with certain additional tagging, randomization etc. Send commands now trigger the actual sending of
bitstrings between machines and/or to the adversary.
4.4 Soundness Definition with Key Cycles (DY-BRSIM Security)
Our security claim is that the realization of the BPW model with symmetric encryption is as secure as
the BPW model with symmetric encryption in the sense of BRSIM/UC even if the surrounding protocol
produces key cycles, as long as it avoids the commitment problem, which we already discussed before
the DKDM definition. In the context of an BRSIM/UC soundness proof, it is even clearer that the
commitment problem must be avoided because it immediately destroys simulatability. (One could resort
to the random oracle model but here one needs a strong version where the simulator reprograms the
oracle, so that the notion breaks down if the random oracle is implemented with a real hash function.)
In [15] the definitions of key-cycle freeness and avoidance of the commitment problem are joined,
unfortunately under the name of commitment-freeness. Essentially we weaken this definition so that
encryption cycles are no longer forbidden. We call the new property “pure commitment-freeness”. The
difference lies in a predicate wrapped where wrapped(j, i) denotes that term j occurs in term i only within
encryptions that the adversary cannot decrypt. In [15] this predicate also contains a condition that such
inner encryptions are consistent with a linear order on the keys and thus cycle-free. We replace it by a
predicate pure wrapped that does not contain this second condition.
The actual definition needs some more notation, mostly from [15]: Given a state of the database D of
the BPW model and an index i, the tree of sub-terms of term i, written tree(D[i]), is defined as follows:
Its root is D[i], and D[j] is a child of D[k] iff j ∈ D[k].arg . An input by user u to encrypt the term that u
knows by handle lhnd with the key it knows by handle skhnd is written inu?.sym encrypt(sk
hnd, lhnd). The
notation inu?.send A(l
hnd) means that user u sends the term it knows by lhnd so that it will be received
by the adversary. (The actual input in the original notation is send x (lhnd, v) with x ∈ {i, r} or v 6∈ H.)
The type enc means an asymmetric ciphertext. The wrapping of a term in another one is now defined
as follows.
11
Definition 4.1 (Wrapping) Given a state of the database D of the BPW model and indices i, j, the
predicate pure wrapped(j, i) is true iff for every occurrence of the node D[j] in tree(D[i]), there exists
a node D[k] in tree(D[i]) such that D[k].type ∈ {symenc, enc} and the following holds: For pkse :=
D[k].arg [2] (the index of a so-called public tag of the used key; these tags are needed for situations where
the adversary can distinguish whether several symmetric encryptions have been made with the same
key), sk := pkse +1 (the corresponding secret key) and l := D[k].arg [1] (the encrypted message) we have
D[sk ].hnda = ↓, i.e., the adversary does not know the key, and the given occurrence of D[j] in the tree
is a descendant of D[l]. We then say that term j is wrapped in term i. ✸
The property Pure NoComm denoting the absence of the commitment problem is now defined as in [15]
except for using pure wrapped. It states that if some user u encrypts a term l1 at time t with a secret
key sk unknown to the adversary, and a user v sends a term l2 at a later time t
′ such that the adversary
learns it and sk is contained in this term, then sk is wrapped in l2.
Definition 4.2 (Pure Commitment Freeness) We say that a run of the BPW model Syscry sym,idn,L
(with users and an adversary) fulfills the property Pure NoComm iff the following holds: If there exists
t ∈ N, sk ∈ INDS , u ∈ H, and lhnd1 ∈ HNDS such that for skse
hnd





1 ) ∧ D[sk ].type = skse ∧ D[sk ].hnda = ↓
then the following must hold for every t′ > t, v ∈ H, and lhnd2 ∈ HNDS:
(inv?.send A(l
hnd
2 ) ∧ D[sk ] ∈ tree(D[hndv = l
hnd
2 ]))




Definition 4.3 (Purely Commitment-free Users) A machine H interacting with the BPW model
Syscry sym,idn,L is called purely commitment-free iff the property Pure NoComm from Definition 4.2 holds
in all runs and with all adversaries. The restriction of blackbox reactive simulatability to purely
commitment-free users is denoted by ≥Pure NoComm. ✸
Definition 4.4 (DY-BRSIM Security) A symmetric encryption scheme SE is DY-BRSIM-secure iff
Syscry sym,realn,S,E,SA,SE,L′ ≥
Pure NoComm Syscry sym,idn,L whenever the other underlying cryptographic systems and
L,L′ fulfill the requirements from [15]. ✸
In reality, a protocol π using Syscry sym,idn,L or Sys
cry sym,real
n,S,E,SA,SE,L′ will usually determine whether the property
Pure NoComm always holds. Thus one first has to analyze π for commitment-freeness, which should be
in scope of automated tools. If yes, the BRSIM/UC soundness implies that a formal analysis of other
properties of π carried out over the ideal Dolev-Yao functionality is also valid for π using the real
functionality.
With these definitions, our soundness theorem can now be written as follows:
Theorem 4.1 (Poly DKDM → DY-BRSIM) Every polynomial-oracle DKDM-secure symmetric
encryption scheme SE is also DY-BRSIM secure. ✷
We do not prove the necessity of DKDM security, but en- and decryptions as in AKDM and the additional
key revelations as in DKDM security do occur in such a symbolic model. (We will see how they occur in
our proof in Section 4.6, where we use a DKDM oracle within the overall systems.) At least for the goal
of BRSIM/UC it seems hard to imagine how such a model could be simulated without allowing these
capabilities in the underlying definition of encryption security.
4.5 Overview of the Simulator
For proving a soundness theorem without key cycles, a simulator SimH has been defined in [15] such
that the combination of arbitrary polynomial-time users H and adversary A cannot distinguish the
combination of the real machines Mu from the combination THH and SimH (for all sets H indicating
the correct machines). We do not need to change this simulator at all, only the later proof of correct
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simulation. Basically SimH translates real messages from the real adversary A into terms as THH expects
them and vice versa. In both directions, SimH has to parse an incoming message completely because it
can only construct the other version (abstract or real) bottom-up. This is done by recursive algorithms.
The state of SimH mainly consists of a database Da, similar to the databases Du , but storing the
knowledge of the adversary. For understanding our soundness proof, it suffices to give a sketch of SimH
here; we refer the reader to [15] for the detailed definition.
Basically SimH translates real messages from the real adversary A into handles as THH expects them
at its adversary input port ina? and vice versa. In both directions, SimH has to parse an incoming
message completely because it can only construct the other version (abstract or real) bottom-up. This
is done by recursive algorithms. The state of SimH mainly consists of a database Da, similar to the
databases Du , but storing the knowledge of the adversary. The behavior of SimH is sketched as follows.
Inputs from THH. Assume that SimH receives an input (u, v, x, l
hnd) from THH, meaning that user u
sends a term/message lhnd to user v over a channel of type x (secure, authentic but not secret, or insecure).
If a bitstring l for lhnd already exists in Da, i.e., this message is already known to the adversary, the
simulator immediately outputs l at a port netu,v ,x !. Otherwise, it first constructs such a bitstring l
with a recursive algorithm id2real. This algorithm decomposes the abstract term using the operations
provided by the Dolev-Yao model. At the same time, id2real builds up a corresponding real bitstring
using real cryptographic operations and enters all new message parts into Da to recognize them when
they are reused, both by THH and by A.
We sketch how the simulator specifically deals with symmetric encryption. If the entry corresponding
to lhnd is a symmetric encryption key, id2real creates a new secret key and uses this key whenever an
abstract encryption has to be simulated under the abstract key entry lhnd. If the entry corresponding
to lhnd is a symmetric encryption, SimH first determines the corresponding secret key by means of the
public key identifier of the encryption. After that, it checks whether the adversary already has a handle
to this secret key. If this is the case, the Dolev-Yao model allows for retrieving the plaintext of the
encrypted message, so id2real only has to encrypt this plaintext with the determined secret key and
output this encryption. Otherwise, the Dolev-Yao model only allows for retrieving the length of the
encrypted message. In this case, id2real encrypts a fixed message of equal length.
Inputs from A. Now assume that SimH receives a bitstring l from A at a port netu,v ,x?. If l is not a
valid list, SimH aborts the transition. Otherwise it translates l into a corresponding handle l
hnd by an
algorithm real2id, and outputs the abstract sending command adv send x (v, u, lhnd) at port ina!.
If a handle lhnd for l already exists in Da, then real2id reuses that. Otherwise it recursively parses
a real bitstring using the functional parsing algorithm. At the same time, it builds up a corresponding
abstract term in the database of THH. This finally yields the handle l
hnd. Furthermore, real2id enters
all new subterms into Da. For building up the abstract term, real2id makes extensive use of the special
capabilities of the adversary modeled in THH. In the real system, the bitstring may, e.g., contain an
encryption for which no key is known yet that yields a valid decryption. Therefore, the simulator has to
be able to insert such an encryption with unknown key and unknown plaintext into the database of THH.
Similarly, the adversary might send a new encryption key which has to be added to existing symmetric
encryption entries for which this key is valid. These and similar cases for symmetric encryption are
covered by using the special adversary capabilities of the Dolev-Yao model.
4.6 Proof of Correct Simulation
In the overall proof in [15] a system CH, called initial combined system, is defined that essentially
contains all aspects of both the BPW model and its realization. It extends the database D of THH by
an attribute word containing real bitstrings as in MH or SimH. These real words are computed as in MH
for entries generated by the honest users, and as in SimH for entries resulting from network inputs, i.e.,
values coming from the adversary. Hence all symmetric encryptions produced by honest users contain
a real plaintext message. A second system C∗H, called final combined system, is equal to CH except for
symmetric encryptions: For encryptions made by honest users and with keys of honest users and without
adversary handle, a simulated message 0len
∗
of the same length is encrypted instead of a real plaintext
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message. To distinguish keys generated by honest users from keys generated by the adversary in CH and
C∗H, entries of type skse have an additional attribute owner ∈ {honest, adv}. The only part of the overall
proof that concerns symmetric encryption and their potential key cycles is the indistinguishability of
these two systems CH and C
∗
H. All other proof parts remain exactly the same.
Reduction to DKDM Security of Symmetric Encryption. We now show that the combined
systems CH and C
∗
H are reactively indistinguishable, i.e., black-box simulatable without the need for an
additional simulator. The core of this proof is to show how a DKDM oracle SymDKDM can be used to
simulate either CH or C
∗
H, depending on the bit b in SymDKDM. We call the rest of this simulation C
′
H,
i.e., the combination of C′H and SymDKDM should yield CH or C
∗
H depending on b. Clearly, C
′
H calls
SymDKDM for encryption and decryption with symmetric encryption keys unknown to the adversary.
However, the combined systems can also use such a key in operations not supported by SymDKDM, e.g.,
put the key into a list and send the list over a secure or insecure channel. For these operations we use
lazy evaluation, i.e., we leave open as long as possible if the key will remain secret and thus be treated
using a reference in a function g, or if it has to be revealed so that C′H can use it directly to perform
operations without outer encryption. Thus C′H, in contrast to CH and C
∗
H, may contain terms for which
no real version is yet known, i.e., there are database entries D[t ind] with D[t ind].word = ↓. We call this
“uninstantiated”. Terms are fully instantiated when they are sent in an insecure way, i.e., if C′H has to
give the adversary a real message. Then it uses the reveal command of the DKDM oracle to obtain keys
about which information is leaked. Additionally, for each symmetric key, C′H stores a key number jno
that equals the number of this key in SymDKDM. The detailed definition of C′H from CH reconsiders all
commands where CH constructs a real word corresponding to the symmetric encryption scheme.
Definition 4.5 (Combined Systems with DKDM Oracle) The combined system with DKDM or-
acle C′H is defined like CH with the following exceptions: The database entries for secret keys are extended
by an attribute jno, and there is a counter cnt for secret keys, initialized as 0. The following changes
are made for inputs at every port inu? with u ∈ H:
• In key generation, C′H sets D[sk
ind].jno := ++cnt for the new database entry D[sk ind]. The word
attribute implicitly remains undefined, i.e., D[sk ind].word = ↓.
• In an encryption command chnd ← sym encrypt(sksehnd, lhnd), let sk ind := D[hndu = sksehnd].ind
and c ind := D[hndu = c
hnd].ind. If D[sk ind].owner = adv, then C′H acts like CH, else it leaves
D[c ind] uninstantiated.
• In all other commands except sending, i.e., list construction, signatures etc., the potential new
entry is instantiated as before if all its (direct) arguments are instantiated, otherwise it is left
undefined. (Note that a decryption command in CH never computes a new attribute word, i.e., we
need not consider it here.)
• In an operation send A(lhnd) let l ind := D[hndu = lhnd].ind. (Recall that this denotes send operations
where the sent term becomes known to the adversary.) Let T := tree(D[l ind]), and let Tenc be the
tree of symmetric ciphertexts within T : Its root is D[l ind] (even if this is not a symmetric ciphertext)
and D[c ind] is a child of D[c′
ind
] in Tenc if it is a symmetric ciphertext, i.e., D[c
ind].type = symenc
and a descendent of D[c′
ind
] in T and no other entry on the path between them is a symmetric
ciphertext.
Furthermore, for every t ind let tree top(D[t ind]) denote the tree derived from tree(D[t ind]) by treating
inner symmetric ciphertexts as leaves.
First C′H recursively instantiates all symmetric encryption keys in T that leak during this sending
by applying a recursive procedure inst keys(l ind). Generally, inst keys(t ind) acts as follows:
– Reveal all uninstantiated secret keys in T ′ := tree top(D[t ind]), i.e., for all D[sk ind] ∈ T ′ with
D[sk ind].type = skse and D[sk ind].word = ↓, input (reveal, D[sk ind].jno) to SymDKDM. For the
resulting output sk, set D[sk ind].word := sk.
– Call inst keys(c ind) for all directly enclosed ciphertexts that the adversary can decrypt, i.e., for
every child D[c ind] of D[t ind] in Tenc where D[sk
ind].hnda 6= ↓ for sk
ind := D[c ind].arg [1].
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Secondly, C′H instantiates the uninstantiated ciphertexts D[c
ind] ∈ Tenc bottom-up, and for each
such ciphertext also tree top(D[c ind]), i.e., the directly enclosed terms. We call the procedure for
one such ciphertext inst enc(c ind). Bottom-up implies that within this procedure, all children of
D[c ind] in Tenc, the directly enclosed ciphertexts, are instantiated.
In inst enc(c ind) we first distinguish whether the key is known: Let sk ind := D[c ind].arg [1]. If
D[sk ind].hnd a 6= ↓, then the first recursion, i.e., the procedure inst keys, ensured that all secret keys
in T ′ := tree top(D[c ind]) are instantiated. Hence all leaves in T ′ are instantiated and C′H can
instantiate the rest of T ′ like CH, i.e., compute the attributes word for all the sub-term entries.
Otherwise, C′H sets j := D[sk
ind].jno) and p ind := D[c ind].arg [2]. It then obtains the ciphertext
by a call c ← (enc, j, gl ind) to SymDKDM, and sets D[c
ind].word := c. Here the function gpind
corresponding to evaluating the plaintext term is constructed as follows: Let T ′′ := tree top(D[p ind]).
Then we translate T ′′ into a function bottom-up:
– Leaves other than secret keys are instantiated, i.e., constants in the function.
– A leaf that is a secret key is instantiated by the RAM program πj′ where j
′ is the attribute
jnr of this secret key entry.
– Lists are translated in the canonical way.
– For a signature or a MAC, which are probabilistic operations, choose a random string r of
sufficient length for the computation and construct the deterministic function that computes
the signature or MAC with this randomness. This randomness must be stored with this entry
and reused if this signature or MAC occurs again.
– For an asymmetric encryption, the combined systems always encrypt strings of zeros, i.e., an
asymmetric encryption term is always fully instantiated.
Finally, when a message is received from the adversary A, the recursive procedure for converting terms
into corresponding bitstrings (called id2real in [15]), like SimH, tries to decrypt received ciphertexts with
all keys known to the adversary, i.e., keys with D[sk ind].hnda 6= ↓. Then we have that D[sk
ind].word 6= ↓
in C′H and thus C
′
H can decrypt like CH. ✸
The following lemma establishes the indistinguishability of the combined system with DKDM oracle and
the initial and final combined systems, respectively, and it thus completes the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Lemma 4.1 (Correct Rewriting of Combined Systems) The combination of C′H and SymDKDM
with bit b = 0 is reactively indistinguishable from CH, and with bit b = 1 it is reactively indistinguishable
from C∗H, if the user and/or distinguisher fulfill the property Pure NoComm. ✷
Proof. We first prove the following additional lemma:
Lemma 4.2 The combination of C′H and SymDKDM (independent of bit b = 0) always fulfils the fol-
lowing invariant: For all sk ind with D[sk ind].type = skse and D[sk ind].owner = honest, we have
D[sk ind].jno ∈ Rev ⇐⇒ D[sk ind].word 6= ↓ ⇐⇒ D[sk ind].hnd a 6= ↓ .
Furthermore, if these conditions are true, then D[sk ind].word := skj for j := D[sk
ind].jno. ✷
Proof. The first equivalence is clear because C′H instantiates a secret key, i.e., assigns a value to its
attribute word , exactly in all situations after it made an input (reveal, D[sk ind].jno) to SymDKDM. For
the resulting output sk , it sets D[sk ind].word := sk , which proves the last statement.
The second equivalence is true because assigning adversary handles follows exactly the same recursion
pattern as the first recursion in Definition 4.5. More precisely, a symmetric key with the attribute
D[sk ind].owner = honest was originally created by an honest user and thus with D[sk ind].hnda = ↓. An
adversary handle is later only assigned in the evaluation of a send command, and there in the procedure
id2real that C′H executes like TH and Sim, at least as far as handles go. This procedure also follows
the tree of the sent term, assigning adversary handles to all subterms outside encryptions, and within
encryptions with keys that already have adversary handles.
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We now proceed with the proof of Lemma 4.1. First, the last sentence of the construction contained
a claim. This is always true by Lemma 4.2.
The main statement of the lemma looks quite clear for b = 0 because C′H essentially acts like CH. It
only uses SymDKDM for some operations with symmetric encryption keys, and when it performs other
operations on the same encryption keys itself, it uses the same actual bitstring D[sk ind].word := skj by
Lemma 4.2.
We only have to show that SymDKDM performs operations with encryption keys like CH would.
This is clear by construction except in cases where SymDKDM refuses an operation. These cases are an
encryption when already j ∈ Rev , and a revelation if already j ∈ Enc. Thus we show that C′H does not
make such requests.
A query of the form (enc, j, g) is only made in a send operation, and only if D[sk ind].hnd a = ↓ for the
(one) key with D[sk ind].jno = j. Then j 6∈ Rev by Lemma 4.2.
A query (reveal, j) is also only made in a send operation. Assume that this happens at time t2, and for
contradiction that j ∈ Enc at this time. Then a query (enc, j, ·) must have been made at a time t1 < t2.
As in the previous paragraph, this implies D[sk ind].hnda = ↓ at time t1 for the key with D[sk
ind].jno = j.
The query (enc, j, ·) is only made by C′H if the term sent contains an encryption with the j-th key, i.e.,
there exists a term D[c ind] with D[c ind].type = symenc and D[c ind].arg [1] = sk ind. Such a term must have
been constructed with a command sym encrypt(skhnd, lhnd) by a user u with D[hndu = sk
hnd].ind = sk ind
at a time t0 < t1. Furthermore, we have u ∈ H because D[sk
ind].hnda = ↓ also at time t0. This
is the precondition for the property Pure NoComm. Thus the implication of this property must hold
for our considered sending operation at time t2, i.e., the key must be wrapped in the term t that is
actually sent, formally pure wrapped(sk ind, t ind). We now show that this contradicts the precondition
that a query (reveal, j) was made in this operation. By definition, pure wrapped(sk ind, t ind) means that
for every occurrence of D[sk ind] in tree(D[t ind]), there exists an intermediate encryption D[k ind] with
D[k ind] = symenc (the alternative enc is not possible here because CH and thus C
′
H contains only fake
asymmetric encryptions) and D[k ind].hnd a = ↓. Then, however, the recursive procedure inst keys(t ind)
does not reach D[sk ind] and thus no query (reveal, j) is made. This finishes the proof that C′H together
with SymDKDM with bit b = 0 perfectly simulates CH.
Now we consider b = 1, i.e., the fake DKDM oracle. The only difference is that in certain encryptions,
a zero-string is now encrypted instead of a real message. This happens iff SymDKDM is called for an
encryption, and thus if the ciphertext was initially uninstantiated and therefore not obtained from the
adversary, and if D[sk ind].owner = honest and D[sk ind].hnd a 6= ↓.
Similarly, C∗H only differs from CH in encrypting zero-strings if encryptions are made by honest users
and with keys of honest users that have no adversary handle. This is the same condition. Furthermore,
in both cases this replacement is applied immediately before the operation sym encrypt.
5 Relations Between the Definitions of Secure Symmetric En-
cryption
In this section we investigate the relations between our definitions, together with underlying definitions
such as IND-CCA2 security and ciphertext integrity. We summarize these results in Figure 1.
Arrows with labels “Th.x” or “L.y” refer to theorems and lemmas in this paper; some other arrows
carry citations. Dotted, striked-through arrows show that an implication does not hold. Arrows without
a label are clear from the definitions. There are three arrows with a question mark; they all correspond to
essentially the same open question whether AKDM security implies DKDM security without a restriction
on the number of revealed keys. This question seems similar to the selective decommitment problem [39],
but not directly related to the cases with known answers. We believe that all relations between definitions
without arrows can be derived from the existing arrows.
5.1 Relations Between AKDM Security and Simpler Definitions

























Figure 1: Summary of the implications between the definitions
Lemma 5.1 A polynomial-oracle or unrestricted AKDM-secure encryption scheme SE is also
polynomial-oracle or unrestricted KDM-secure, respectively, and it provides integrity of ciphertexts and
is IND-CCA2-secure. ✷
Proof. That AKDM security implies KDM security is clear since for an adversary making only encryption
queries, an AKDM oracle acts exactly like a KDM oracle with the same bit b.
Once we also showed integrity of ciphertexts, IND-CCA2 security follows because KDM security
implies IND-CPA security, and with the same proof this holds for polynomial-oracle KDM security.
Then IND-CPA security together integrity of ciphertexts implies IND-CCA2 security, see Figure 1.
For proving integrity of ciphertexts, assume that an adversary A has a not negligible INT-CTXT
advantage δ. We construct an adversary AAKDM against the AKDM oracle SymAKDM as follows, using
A as a blackbox:
• It translates each encryption query (enc,m) from A into a query (enc, 1, gm) to SymAKDM, where
gm denotes the RAM program that maps everything to the constantm. For the resulting ciphertext
c, it stores (m, c) in a set C and returns c to A.
• For each decryption query (dec, c) from A it first checks whether there exists a pair (m, c) ∈ C . If
yes, it returns m to A. If not, it inputs (dec, 1, c) into SymAKDM. If the result is ↓, it returns that
to A. Otherwise it outputs b∗ = 1 and aborts the simulation. Let E denote this event.
• If A finishes its attack and AAKDM has not aborted, then AAKDM outputs b∗ = 0.
Clearly AAKDM ∈ Ap already for a polynomial p of degree 1.
If b = 0 in SymAKDM, i.e., the oracle is real, then AAKDM perfectly simulates the ciphertext-integrity
oracle SymInt until a potential occurrence of E. This event, a new valid ciphertext from A, happens
exactly if A is successful. Thus Pr[b∗ = 1 | b = 0] = δ. If b = 1, the oracle is fake and never decrypts a
new ciphertext c. Thus Pr[b∗ = 1 | b = 1] = 0. Hence the AKDM advantage of AAKDM is not negligible.
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Theorem 5.1 KDM security, integrity of ciphertexts, and IND-CCA2 security together do not imply
polynomial-oracle AKDM security. ✷
Proof. Let an encryption scheme SE = (genSE,E,D) be given that is KDM secure and provides integrity
of ciphertexts. (Recall that IND-CCA2 security is a consequence of these properties.) We construct an
encryption scheme SE∗ = (genSE,E∗,D∗) that is not polynomial-oracle AKDM-secure, but still provides
KDM security and integrity of ciphertexts. Let
• E∗(sk ,m)← E(sk ,m)||0;
• D∗(sk , c||0) := D(sk , c);
• For D∗(sk , c||1), let m := D(sk , c). If m = sk , output m, else ↓.
To show that SE∗ is not AKDM-secure, we define an adversary AAKDM that makes two queries to the
ADKM oracle:
• It first inputs (enc, 1, π1) and decomposes the resulting ciphertext c into c′||0.
• It then inputs (dec, 1, c′||1) and expects a message m.
As c′ = E(sk , sk) after the first query, the second query succeeds with the output m = sk when AAKDM
interacts with the real AKDM oracle, while the fake AKDM oracle always outputs ↓ on decryption
queries. Thus AAKDM can distinguish the two oracles.
KDM security follows directly from the KDM security of SE because appending 0 to ciphertexts does
not change anything when only encryption queries can be made.
Finally we show integrity of ciphertexts based on the integrity of ciphertexts of SE . Assume we
have a successful adversary AINT∗ against the oracle SymIntSE∗ . (Here we once need the fully indexed
notation for the oracles.) We then construct an adversary AINT against the oracle SymIntSE as follows,
using AINT∗ as a blackbox:
• It forwards an encryption query (enc,m) to SymInt. If the resulting ciphertext is c, it returns c||0
to AINT∗ and stores c.
• For a decryption query (dec, c′||0), it forwards (dec, c′) to SymInt and forwards the result m.
• For a decryption query (dec, c′||1), it returns ↓.
This simulation is only incorrect if AINT∗ can produce a ciphertext c
′||1 for which SymIntSE∗ would not
return ↓, i.e., where D(sk , c′) = sk . This only happens with negligible probability.
As usual, for cryptographic properties P , Q a statement “P does not imply Q” is always interpreted as
“If there exists a system S that fulfills P , then there also exists a system T that fulfills P ∧ ¬Q”.
In both these lemmas one could omit mentioning IND-CCA2, because KDM security implies IND-
CPA security, and that together with integrity of ciphertexts implies IND-CCA2 as shown in [30].
5.2 Relation of DKDM and AKDM Security
In this section, we consider the relation of AKDM security and DKDM security. We first introduce a
variant of DKDM-security where only a bounded number ρ of keys are revealed, because we can prove
closer relations with AKDM for it than for the original, stronger DKDM-security.
Definition 5.1 (LOG-DKDM Security) An adversary A on the DKDM oracle SymDKDM is called
ρ-revealing for a function ρ if it lets at most ρ(k) keys be revealed in every run. Let Ap,ρ be the class
of p-oracle-bounded and ρ-revealing adversaries from A∞, where p and ρ are polynomials or ∞. We
say that a symmetric encryption scheme SE is (p, ρ)-bounded DKDM-secure iff the DKDM advantage
is negligible for every adversary A ∈ Ap,ρ, and that it is LOG-DKDM-secure iff it is (p, ρ)-bounded







Without loss of generality we can restrict ourselves to classes Ap,ρ with ρ ≤ p. The condition for
LOG-DKDM is fulfilled if pρ or pp−ρ is polynomially bounded. Two important examples of LOG-
DKDM security are that polynomially many keys are generated but only a constant number of them
are revealed, or that a linear fraction of the keys is revealed and pp is polynomial. (Thus p is essentially
logarithmic if there is no extra restriction on ρ; this motivates the name “LOG-DKDM”.)
Clearly, DKDM security implies AKDM security, and polynomial-oracle DKDM or LOG-DKDM
security implies polynomial-oracle AKDM security. We now consider the opposite direction.
Theorem 5.2 A polynomial-oracle AKDM-secure symmetric encryption scheme SE is also LOG-
DKDM-secure. ✷
Proof. Let SE = (genSE,E,D) be a polynomial-oracle AKDM-secure symmetric encryption scheme.






is polynomial and A has a not negligible DKDM advantage against SE .
We construct an adversary AAKDM against the AKDM oracle SymAKDM, using A as a blackbox.
Initially, AAKDM randomly selects a subset S ⊆ {1, . . . , p(k)} of size at most ρ(k). Essentially, S is a
guess at the set Rev of the keys that will be revealed throughout the run. AAKDM therefore generates
keys sk∗i for all i ∈ S itself. Furthermore, it maintains an initially empty set C of ciphertexts made and
sets Rev and Enc of keys already revealed or used for encryption, respectively. Then it handles queries
from A as follows:
• On input (enc, j, g): If j ∈ Rev , it returns ↓ to A. Else if j ∈ S (i.e., the key is assumed to be
revealed later), it aborts. We call this event E1.
Otherwise it sets Enc := Enc ∪ {j} and modifies g to a function g∗ by replacing every reference
to sk i in g with i ∈ S by its own actual key sk
∗
i . It inputs (enc, j, g
∗) into SymAKDM, obtains a
ciphertext c, stores (j, c) in C and outputs c to A.
• On input (dec, j, c): If j ∈ Rev or (j, c) ∈ C , it returns ↓ to A. Else if j ∈ S , it aborts. We call
this event E2. Otherwise it sets Enc := Enc ∪ {j}, inputs (dec, j, c) to SymDKDM, and forwards
the resulting output m to A.
• On input (reveal, j): If j ∈ Enc, it returns ↓ to A. Else if j ∈ S , it returns sk∗j and sets Rev :=
Rev ∪ {j}; otherwise it aborts. We call this abort event E3.
• If A outputs a bit b∗, then AAKDM outputs this as its own bit.
We have AAKDM ∈ Ap because it only gets polynomially many queries, and the functions g it obtains
are of polynomial length and only address key indices up to p(k) by the precondition A ∈ Ap,ρ.
Clearly, AAKDM together with SymAKDM with bit b = 0 (the real oracle) perfectly simulates
SymDKDM with bit b = 0 until a potential event E1, E2, or E3, because for the indices i ∈ S it
consistently uses its own keys sk∗i and for i 6∈ S it consistently uses the keys sk i in SymAKDM. This
also holds for b = 1 because no encryptions and decryptions are made with the keys sk∗i (where the fake
oracle would deviate).
We now show that if S is a correct guess at the final value of the set Rev , short is correct, then no
event E1, E2, or E3 can occur: A query (enc, j, g) or (dec, j, g) with j 6∈ Rev causes j to be put into
Enc, and thus j ∈ Rev cannot become true later in the run. (Recall that always Rev ∩Enc = ∅ and that
the sets only grow.) Thus the condition j ∈ S of E1 and E2 cannot be true. A query (reveal, j) with
j 6∈ Enc causes j to be put into Rev . Thus the condition j 6∈ S of E3 cannot be true.
Hence if S is correct, the simulation is perfect until its end, and the output of AAKDM is correct iff
that of A is correct.
Furthermore, the perfect simulation implies that the view of A is independent of S until a potential





. Hence the advantage of AAKDM is





AdvDKDM(A). This is not negligible, and thus the desired contradition
to AKDM security.
The question whether AKDM security implies DKDM security without a restriction on the number
of revealed keys remains open in this paper. This question bears a strong similarity to the selective
decommitment problem [39], but seems not directly related to the cases with known answers.
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5.3 The Influence of the Polynomial-Oracle Restriction
We start by showing that the polynomial-oracle restriction on the adversary in the definitions really
makes a difference. We first review the original definition of KDM security and augment it with a
polynomial-oracle variant.
Definition 5.2 (KDM Security, with Polynomial-oracle) Given a symmetric encryption scheme
SE = (genSE,E,D), the key-dependent message oracle or KDM oracle SymKDM is defined as follows: It
has a (virtual) infinite sequence of keys ~sk := (sk i)i∈N, where each key, when first used, is initialized as
sk i ← genSE(0k), a bit b initialized as b
R← {0, 1}, and the following query type:
• On input (enc, j, g) with j ∈ N and g ∈ F∞, let m0 := g( ~sk) and m1 := 0|m0| and output c ←
E(skj ,mb).
The KDM advantage of an adversary A that interacts with SymKDM and finally outputs a bit b∗ is
defined as AdvKDM(A) := |Pr[ASymKDM = 1 | b = 0] − Pr[ASymKDM = 1 | b = 1]|. We say that SE is
p-oracle-bounded KDM-secure iff the KDM advantage of every adversary A ∈ Ap is negligible, and that
it is polynomial-oracle KDM-secure iff it is p-oracle-bounded KDM-secure for every polynomial p. ✸
Clearly a KDM-secure encryption system is also polynomial-oracle KDM-secure, and similar for AKDM
and DKDM, but we now show that even the strongest of our polynomial-oracle definitions is not sufficient
for the weakest unrestricted one.
Theorem 5.3 (Polynomial-oracle DKDM 6→ KDM) Polynomial-oracle DKDM security does not
imply unrestricted KDM security. ✷
Proof. Let SE = (genSE,E,D) be a polynomial-oracle DKDM-secure symmetric encryption scheme.
Without loss of generality, let key generation be the uniformly random choice from {0, 1}k. (Typically
this will be true anyway; otherwise one can treat the original randomness in genSE as the key.) Let
f denote a one-way permutation with domains and ranges {0, 1}k. Let SE∗ := (genSE,E∗,D) be the
symmetric encryption scheme where E∗(sk ,m) = 0 if f(m) = sk , else E∗(sk ,m) = E(sk ,m).
We first show that SE∗ is not unrestricted KDM-secure. An adversary A∗ constructs the deterministic
function g that breaks f by brute-force search for the pre-image of the key sk1 among strings of length
k and inputs (enc, 1, g) to the oracle SymKDM. For b = 0 (the real oracle) this always yields 0 by
construction, whereas for b = 1 (the fake oracle) the result is E(sk1, 0
k), which is not equal to 0 with
overwhelming probability. Thus A∗ can easily distinguish real and fake oracle.
We now show that SE∗ is polynomial-oracle DKDM-secure. Assume for contradiction that an adver-
sary A ∈ Ap has a not negligible DKDM advantage for a certain polynomial p. We then construct an
adversary Af that breaks the underlying one-way permutation f using A as a blackbox. Initially Af gets
an input sk∗, which was randomly chosen from {0, 1}k. It selects b R← {0, 1} and i R← {1, . . . , p(k)} and
sets sk i := sk
∗ and sk j
R← {0, 1}k for all j ∈ {1, . . . , p(k)} \ {i}. Now Af simulates the oracle SymDKDM
for bit b; this is clearly possible as it knows all the keys. For every encryption query (enc, i, g) from A,
i.e., with the chosen key index, it additionally checks if f(g( ~sk)) = sk i. If yes, it outputs g( ~sk) as a
pre-image of sk∗ and stops the simulation.
Since A only makes polynomially many queries, and the time complexity of every function g that Af
has to evaluate in encryption queries is at most p(k), the adversary Af runs in polynomial time.
Let Ej denote the event that A in interaction with oracle SymDKDMp makes a query (enc, j, g) such
that f(g( ~sk)) = sk j , and let E := E1 ∪ . . . ∪ Ep(k). If the probability Pr[E] were negligible, then the
same A would also have a not negligible DKDM advantage for the underlying system SE , contradicting
the polynomial-oracle DKDM security of SE . Hence Pr[Ei] is not negligible.
Until a potential occurrence of Ei, the adversary Af perfectly simulates SymDKDM. Thus the
probability that event Ei occurs in the simulation is the same value Pr[Ei] as in the original attack, and
given the uniformly random choice of i, the probability of Ei in the simulation is at least Pr[E]/p(k).
This is still not negligible, and thus the desired contradiction to the security of the one-way permutation.
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5.4 Longer Key Cycles
Finally, to address the question if the key cycle problem is only due to cycles of length one (the case
treated by prior counterexamples), we define security if only longer key cycles are allowed. We first
define a key-dependency graph.
Definition 5.3 (Key-dependency Graph) For a program g ∈ F∞ and a key number i ∈ N, we define
“i ∈ g” to mean that key sk i is addressed by the program g. Let O denote an encryption oracle, i.e., an
oracle that accepts inputs of the form (enc, j, g). Then given a history of calls to O, we define a current
key-dependency graph G. In the initial state, it has no edges. For each input (enc, j, g), an edge (j, i) is
added for every i ∈ g. By G∗ we denote the transitive closure of graph G. ✸
Generally, G could be written with indices O and h for the machine and the history concerned, but this
would seem notational overkill for the following simple definition.
Definition 5.4 (i-KDM Security) Let a symmetric encryption scheme SE be given. Let Ai−cyclesp ⊆
Ap with p a polynomial or ∞ denote the class of adversaries that never produce key cycles of length
less than i, i.e., in interaction with the KDM oracle the current key-dependency graph G never has
cycles of length less than i. We say that SE is i-KDM-secure iff the KDM advantage of every adversary
A ∈ Ai−cycles∞ is negligible, and polynomial-oracle i-KDM-secure iff this holds for all A ∈ A
i−cycles
p for
every polynomial p. ✸
Theorem 5.4 (IND-CPA 6→ polynomial-oracle i-KDM) For all i ∈ N, there exist symmetric en-
cryption schemes that are semantically secure, but not polynomial-oracle i-KDM-secure, at least for
stateful schemes. ✷
Proof. Let a semantically secure symmetric encryption scheme SE = (genSE,E,D) be given. We modify
it as follows to a system SE∗: A new key is a string sk ||r with sk ← genSE(0k) and r
R← {0, 1}k. Let m|k




(E(sk ,m),m|k ⊕ r) if first encryption with sk
E(sk ,m) otherwise.
Decryption D∗ of a ciphertext (c, tag) or c simply decrypts c with D. Note that the system is stateful as
it has to record which key was used for encryption already.
To break the i-KDM security of the new scheme, an adversary A asks for the encryption of sk j
with sk j+1 mod i for all j ∈ {1, . . . , i}, i.e., it enters queries (enc, j + 1 mod i, πj). This set of queries
produces only one key cycle of length i; hence A is a permitted adversary. If A is interacting with
the real KDM oracle SymKDM with b = 0, the resulting ciphertexts are of the form (cj , tagj) with
tagj = rj ⊕ rj+1 mod i, and thus the XOR of all these tags is 0. For the fake oracle, b = 1, the tags are
tagj = 0 ⊕ rj+1 mod i = rj+1 mod i and thus the XOR of all of them is usually not 0. This allows A to
distinguish the oracles.
The semantic security of the new scheme follows from the fact that the tag for each key is random
and thus gives an adversary no new abilities to distinguish.
The next rather simple lemma shows that the definition type from [32], which only allows direct
encryption of keys, not arbitrary functions g as the KDM definition used here, is indeed weaker (here
for the symmetric setting). This seems folklore knowledge but not proven.
Lemma 5.2 In the random oracle model, there exist symmetric encryption schemes that are not KDM-
secure, but secure if the KDM oracle is restricted to functions g denoting exactly one key. ✷
Proof. Given a KDM-secure encryption system SE = (genSE,E,D), we modify it to a system SE
∗ by
changing the encryption algorithm exactly if m = sk +1; then E∗ outputs 0. An adversary A against the
21
KDM oracle inputs a query (enc, 1, g) with g = π1+1. Then the real oracle returns E
∗(sk1, sk1+1) = 0.
Thus A can easily distinguish it from the fake oracle.
An adversary A′ restricted to queries of the form (enc, j, πi), however, can only achieve this case with
negligible probability. Thus the KDM security of SE carries over to SE∗ for these adversaries.
6 Conclusion
We extended the notion of key-dependent message (KDM) security to active attacks and to dynamic
divulging of keys to the adversary, assuming the latter does not introduce a commitment problem; we
call these AKDM and DKDM security. We also introduced a polynomial-oracle version of the definitions
that is sufficient for the computational soundness result and is easier to fulfill in the standard model of
cryptography, where currently no KDM-secure encryption scheme is known.
We constructed efficient schemes secure under the new definitions: For AKDM security, the construc-
tion is generic, i.e., if a KDM-secure scheme in the standard model can be found, then we automatically
get an AKDM-secure scheme in the standard model. For DKDM security, the construction relies directly
on a random oracle.
We proved that DKDM security is sufficient for proving a symbolic abstraction of symmetric en-
cryption secure in the strong sense of BRSIM/UC. The soundness of such abstractions was a major
motivation for the introduction of KDM security in [31]. It was first shown in [3], but only for passive
attacks, which are not sufficient for most usages of symbolic models. We believe that DKDM security is
also necessary for a BRSIM/UC result.
We explored the space of old and new definitions related to KDM security and proved or disproved
equivalences between individual definitions and combinations of several definitions. In particular, we
showed that AKDM security (and consequently DKDM security) is not a consequence of KDM security
and standard definitions of security of symmetric encryption schemes under active attacks, IND-CCA2
and INT-CTXT, so that special constructions are indeed necessary. For stateful encryption schemes,
we showed that the separation between KDM security and semantic security is not only possible by key
cycles of length 1, but of any minimum length i.
The main new open question is whether AKDM security implies DKDM security, or whether DKDM-
secure schemes can be constructed from KDM-secure ones in a way that does not involve a random oracle.
We can show the former if we restrict the number of keys generated or revealed in DKDM security. The
general problem seems very similar to the selective decommitment problem [39], but not directly related
to the cases with known answers.
For Dolev-Yao models with key cycles, the overall consequence is that we have put them on a
computational basis with the DKDM definition and the soundness result; however, as currently only
specially constructed encryption schemes are provably DKDM-secure, and only in the random oracle
model, the soundness is not as good as related results for Dolev-Yao models without key cycles, and we
recommend that the latter be used unless there is a specific need for key cycles. (The same holds for the
passive case based on KDM security.) Although good cryptographic practice is to construct protocols
without key cycles, formal methods are used precisely to analyze protocols automatically that may not
follow any specific design principles. The DKDM definition allows us to prove soundness of Dolev-Yao
models with key cycles, a security feature that has until now not been automatically analyzable.
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